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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter as it is 
before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari from the Court of 
Appeals, according to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Title VII. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Brief in Opposition to Appellant's Petition for 
Certiorari from an order of affirmance entered by the Court of 
Appeals on November 23, 1990. On December 19, 1990 an order 
denying rehearing was entered by the Court of Appeals. 
The underlying decision which was affirmed was made by Judge 
David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989 in which 
the property of the parties was divided equitably, according to the 
terms of a constructive trust which was created between the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari be granted, 
when his petition fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4 6 and 49 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
2. Are there grounds for a Petition for Certiorari to be 
granted in this matter? 
3. Is the Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari frivolous, and 
should the Respondent be granted her reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in responding to Petitioner's request? 
ISSUES AS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER 
4. The issues as presented by the Petitioner are so varied and 
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incoherent as to make a rational response to them difficult, if 
not impossible and the Respondent has chosen not to respond to them 
individually, other than to state that the issues are incoherent 
and irrelevant to this matter at this time. 
4. The Argument presented by the Petitioner, as gleaned by the 
Respondent, is that a new trial should have been held after the 
first decision of the Court of Appeals, and that the parties should 
be deemed to be partners; and that the denial of a new trial and 
a finding that the parties were in partnership, with the 
application of partnership law to the dissolution of the parties 
relationship, was such serious error that the Supreme Court should 
grant Certiorari in this matter. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Title VII Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. This is an appeal from an order entered 
by Judge David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989, 
which terminated the relationship of the parties and equitably 
divided their joint assets pursuant to the legal theory of 
constructive trust. 
Course of the proceedings. This appeal is from a final order 
of Judge David Young of the Third District Court. The Plaintiff 
filed a complaint for divorce on October 14, 1983. The trial in 
this matter was held on June 9, 1987. The Plaintiff and Defendant 
presented witnesses and testimony of both of them was taken, and 
closing arguments were heard. The Trial Court determined that the 
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parties relationship was a common-law marriage, and he equitably 
divided the parties1 assets. 
The defendant appealed, and received a decision dated July 
5, 1989, which indicated that the parties1 relationship was not a 
common-law marriage. The decision did suggest several other legal 
theories which might apply. 
The plaintiff then filed proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order dividing the parties1 assets pursuant 
to a constructive trust, which was approved by the court in 
December, 1989. 
The defendant then filed the appeal to the Court of Appeals 
which affirmed the order of the District Court on November 23, 
1990. Appellant's request for rehearing was denied on December 
18, 1990. 
Disposition in the trial court. After the Court of Appeals 
decision on July 5, 1989, the Trial Court found that the parties 
relationship was a constructive trust, based upon the confidential 
nature of the parties' relationship, and the substantial unjust 
enrichment which would occur if the defendant were allowed to 
retain all of the parties' assets. 
Statement of material facts. Plaintiff, Helen Layton, 
hereinafter known as "Helen" and the Defendant, Donald Layton, 
hereinafter known as "Don" met in 1946 when Helen was fifteen 
(T57,L17) years old. After about two years, Helen began to work 
with Don cutting down trees, before and after her other job 
(T58,L7). In 1952, at age 20 she became pregnant, and went to 
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California (T59,L2) for a time, but returned to Utah and lived with 
Don's parents until the baby (the parties1 son Robert), was born 
on November 6, 1952 (T59,L11). Helen then lived with her parents 
until 1954. During this time, Helen and Don felled trees for a 
living. With the money they earned, she and Don bought a fire 
damaged house located at Banks Court in Salt Lake City (T59,L14), 
and worked together to make it habitable, and in 1954 Helen and 
young Robert moved in (T60,L19). Don moved in a short time later. 
Don and Helen intended to get married, and even purchased a 
marriage license, but they "never got around" to getting married 
(T61,L22). The parties began living together in 1954 and lived 
together almost continuously until 1983, when this action was 
filed. (F.F.#1) 
The parties continued to work together, felling trees and 
demolishing houses for income. They began purchasing real property 
at tax sales, and bought a number of parcels, and one five acre 
parcel which was located at 3 3 00 South and Wasatch Boulevard was 
purchased for the sum of $6,666.66 which was paid in $1,000 per 
year installments (T62,L25). In approximately 1961 that property 
was sold for the sum of $40,000.00 and the parties used those funds 
to purchase further properties. 
Helen always participated in the choice of property and the 
negotiations for price and terms of each purchase. Over the years, 
some parcels have been sold or condemned by various government 
agencies, and the proceeds from those sales have always been used 
to pay expenses for the family, the properties, or to purchase 
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further parcels. 
From 1954 until 1980 the parties supported themselves from 
the earnings of the properties, the sale of raspberries and other 
fruit tended and picked by them, from tree felling, and demolition 
work. Neither party had regular full time employment for a third 
person. (F.F.#3) Helen worked alongside Don on a full time basis, 
even when pregnant with their three subsequent children (T63,L10). 
The only time she did not work an equal amount with Don was when 
Angie (born in 1962) and Michael (born in 1964) were very small, 
but as soon as they were in school she resumed roofing, painting, 
and otherwise managing the parties1 properties. She also did all 
of the bookkeeping for the family, which was a considerable amount 
of work, during those years (F.F.#3,4) 
Helen and Don held themselves out to all who knew them as a 
married couple (T27,L18) (T20,L3) (T12,L25) (T37,L25), and the real 
property purchased by them reflects both of their names. The 
parcels which do not reflect joint ownership which Helen claims 
should be awarded to her are titled in Don's name alone due to an 
oversight. The parties had no funds which were not joint, and all 
property purchased during that time should be (and most were) 
placed in joint names. 
The parties had a joint bank account (T64,L2), in the name 
of Don or Helen Layton and they filed joint income tax returns each 
year (T63,L24) (F.F.#2). All income from their various pursuits 
was used to support themselves, their children, and the properties, 
and there is no indication that there was any division of any of 
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the real or personal property of the parties along the lines of 
"yours" or "mine" during the history of the parties prior to their 
difficulties and final separation. 
In early 1971 Danny was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome, 
and the parties troubles began. Helen was asked to leave the 
parties1 residence in 1976 (T67,L1), and was gone for three months, 
but moved back to the family residence at Banks Court in October 
of that year. In early 1977 Helen again moved out (T67,L6), this 
time for four months, and then again moved back to Banks Court (the 
family residence). During this separation Helen had no outside 
job, and continued to do what she could to further the family 
business. 
During the 1970 fs the Plaintiff did make the writing which 
states "I hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name 
of Don Layon and Helen Layton." There is no evidence of 
consideration for the writing, and the property mentioned therein 
is not identified with enough particularity for the Court to 
determine what property, if any, was being transferred. (F.F. #14, 
15,16. ) 
The parties did not later ratify the writing by tranferring 
all of the jointly held real or personal property into the name of 
the Defendant, or otherwise behave as though they thought the 
writing had any validity. (F.F.17) 
In November of 1979 Helen went to California (T70,L5) and did 
obtain employment there. She returned in April of 1980 to file a 
joint income tax return with Don, as the parties had done since 
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approximately 1954. In May of that year, Don purchased the house 
at Villa Drive, "for Helen." (T50,L8) She returned to Utah in May 
and moved into the house. Helen obtained employment with Gem State 
Mutual Insurance Company in the Fall of 1980, and her earnings went 
to pay the household expenses on the Villa Drive house (T71,L25), 
along with whatever else was needed. During this time she still 
worked to care for the properties on weekends and evenings (took 
her vacation to pick raspberries) and the parties still lived 
together and held themselves out to be husband and wife. Don 
lived at Banks Court for a few months after May of 1980, but 
eventually he moved to the Villa Drive house and the parties lived 
together until 1983 (T72,L7). Helen left the Villa Drive house in 
1983 and filed this action. 
The property of the parties was essentially intact at the time 
of the filing of this action. (F.F.19). 
Don has had the full management and control of all of the 
parties1 properties, both real and personal, since the filing of 
this action. He has had the personal use and enjoyment of all of 
the income from the property, and he has had the burden of caring 
for the property, but he has not paid all of the property taxes 
and assessments which are outstanding against the real property of 
the parties. The income from the properties is approximately 
$32,000 per year, and the property taxes are approximately $12,000 
per year, leaving a difference of $22,000 per year for living 
expenses and any other expenses required for the property.(F.F.#12) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PRESENTED TO COURT OF APPEALS 
1. The findings and decree of the Trial Court are supported 
by the evidence and are not an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiff 
presented evidence that she and the Defendant had a continuous, if 
sometimes stormy, relationship from 1954 until 1983. Witnesses and 
documents presented into evidence proved that the parties1 
relationship was of the type contemplated by the cases regarding 
constructive trust, as the defendant was holding assets which in 
equity and good conscience should be possessed by the plaintiff, 
due to their long relationship and the absence of separate funds 
between them.(F.F.#8,9,10) 
A great injustice would occur if the defendant were allowed 
to retain all of the parties1 assets, almost all of which are held 
in joint name, which represented the fruit of both parties' 
lifetime of work and effort. 
The Defendant at trial, or since the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, has refused to provide any evidence or argument as to the 
fairness or lack thereof of the proposed property settlement, other 
than to allege that the Plaintiff should receive nothing. The 
Plaintiff produced an extensive exhibit of the properties, showing 
their locations, tax valuations, purchase prices, and including 
photographs, if relevant. The Plaintiff stated under oath that she 
would agree that the Defendant could receive either side of the 
list dividing the property prepared by her. The Defendant has never 
presented any evidence that the division according to that list was 
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unfair. Accordingly, the division was equitable, and the Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that the relationship between 
the parties consisted of a constructive trust, which should now be 
dissolved. 
There is no need for further evidentiary hearing or amendment 
of pleadings, as the evidence at trial was complete, and adequately 
addressed the issues presented by the theory of constructive trust 
as well as the legal theories actually presented at trial. In any 
event, the defendant did not object to the Court's determination 
that a constructive trust existed between the parties, and 
accordingly should not be allowed to do so now. 
2. The law relating to constructive trusts was correctly 
applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court 
should stand. The theory of constructive trust requires a 
confidential relationship between the parties, and an inequity 
which would result if one of the parties were allowed to retain 
assets as a result of the confidential relationship, to the 
detriment of the other party. Such a relationship existed here, 
and accordingly, the law was correctly applied.(F.F.#8,9,10) 
ARGUMENT REGARDING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
1. The Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari fails to meet the 
requirements of Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, in that it fails to address the requirements for 
Certiroari to be granted, which in question and answer form are: 
(a) Has a panel of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
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Appeals on the same issue of law? 
No. The Petitioner does not cite any conflict within the 
Court of Appeals which would justify a Writ of Certiorari being 
granted. 
(b) Has a panel of the Court of Appeals decided question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision 
of the Supreme Court? 
No. The Petitioner does not cite any conflict between the 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which would justify a Writ 
of Certiorari being granted. 
(c) Has the Court of Appeals rendered a decisions that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court!s power of 
supervision? 
No. Both decisions by the Court of Appeals have not sanctioned 
any departure of the lower court from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings. The decisions in this matter are 
equitable under the very unusual circumstances of this case, and 
this matter does not need any reconsideration by the Supreme Court. 
(d) Has the Court of Appeals decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should 
be, settled by the Supreme Court: 
No. This matter does not rely upon municipal, state, or 
federal statutory law, but instead relies upon case law in the 
State of Utah. 
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2. This Petition for Certiorari is frivolous, given the 
incoherent nature of the Petitioner's brief and arguments before 
the Court of Appeals, and the bizarre nature of his Petition for 
Certiorari, and his continued irse of the judicial process to harass 
the Respondent at great personal cost to her. 
3. The Respondent should be awarded her reasonable 
attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the 
incoherent and repetitive nature of the Petitioner's arguments, and 
the frivolousness of his Petition. The appellant failed to file 
a supersedeas bond in this matter, yet the mere existence of this 
continued appeal has prevented the Respondent from selling any of 
the property awarded to her to raise badly needed cash. To 
compound that injury, she has been forced to expend her meager 
funds to pay attorney's fees to respond to yet another appellate 
Petition in this matter. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT 
Don, by his Petition, has asked the Supreme Court to grant 
Certiorari in this matter, in order to obtain a new trial and have 
the parties' relationship declared to be a partnership. The 
Petitioner has failed, in prior briefs and in this one, to show how 
there would be a different result if the parties relationship was 
a partnership, or what new evidence could be presented at a new 
trial which would cause the trial court, or subsequent appellate 
court, to render a different decision. As a result of his failure 
to show how the result could possibly be different, Petitioner has 
failed to meet his burden of proving that the decision of the Court 
11 
of Appeals so departs from accepted law that it should be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties had a 19 year relationship, during which time they 
raised four children and pooled all of their assets. Don has 
attempted to appropriate those assets for himself, and the Trial 
Court and the Court of Appeals have refused to allow him to do so. 
Instead, the Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has 
imposed a constructive trust upon the parties and their assets, and 
has equitably divided them between the parties. 
This matter is one that contains unusual facts, and which has 
had a long and strange history largely due to the Petitioner's 
representation of himself in this matter. The decisions in this 
matter are correct under the law and facts of this matter, and 
there is no need for review by the Supreme Court. That review 
alone, regardless of result, would cause considerable hardship for 
the Respondent, who has already suffered through two appeals in 
this matter. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Respondent requests that the Petitioner's Petition for 
Certiorari be denied, and that she be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in replying to the Petitioner's 
request. 
DATED this day of March, 1991. 
Jane Allen 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Helen Layton 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari to the 
Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
this day of March, 1991. 
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CieEgbf )h« Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Helen Layton, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Donald Layton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870378-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Donald Layton, Salt Lake City, Pro Se Appellant 
Jane Allen, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Bullock.* 
BULLOCK, Judge: 
The defendant appeals from an order of the district court 
dividing property owned by unmarried cohabitants at the end of 
their relationship. 
Donald and Helen Layton lived together and held themselves 
out to be husband and wife for many years, although they were 
never legally married. Four children were born to "the Laytons," 
the youngest of whom is a mentally handicapped child of about 18 
years. 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1)(j) (1937). 
During their life together, the parties both worked fulltime 
in the same business endeavors, such as felling trees; acquiring, 
renovating, renting, and selling real property; picking and 
selling raspberries; and a variety of other pursuits* Title to 
most of their relatively extensive property holdings is in 
cotenancy;2 however, title to some parcels is in Donaldfs name 
alone, and one parcel acquired in part with joint funds appears 
to be in Helenfs name alone. Helen sued for divorce in 1983 and 
later amended her complaint to add a claim for partition. The 
district court concluded that the parties' relationship was a 
marriage as defined in Utah Code Ann, § 30-1-4.5 (1989), and that 
their assets could therefore "be divided according to the 
equitable principles governing divorce actions.- A decree was 
accordingly entered dividing the property. Neither alimony nor 
divorce is mentioned in the decree. Custody of the handicapped 
child was awarded to Helen, who was also awarded child support of 
$200 per month. 
Donald challenges the division of property on appeal. He 
argues, in effect, that there is no legal basis for awarding any 
property to Helen, that their relationship cannot be treated as a 
marriage, and that Helen relinquished her rights to the cotenancy 
property awarded her as evidenced by an unsigned, undated note, 
which appears to be in Helen's handwriting. The note reads: HI 
hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don 
Layton [and] Helen Layton.H Donald also argues against the 
custody award. 
In reviewing the property division, we turn first to a 
consideration of the trial court's conclusion that the Laytons' 
relationship could be treated as a marriage according to Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, which recognizes as a marriage a 
relationship between cohabitants if the relationship satisfies 
certain specified criteria. Before adoption of section 30-1-4.5 
in 1987, Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a 
marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have 
acted in other respects as spouses.3 
2. We use the term "cotenancy" in this case to refer to either 
joint tenancy or tenancy in common, since the distinctions 
between the two are not material in this case. 
3. Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah App. 1988). 
2 
The complaint in this case was filed in 1983, about four 
years before section 30-1-4.5 was enacted. Since that section 
affects the substantive rights of the parties, and absent a 
contrary provision by the legislature in enacting it, it has only 
prospective, and not retroactive, effect.4 Thus, the trial 
court mischaracterized the Laytons1 relationship as a marriage. 
Helen suggests alternative grounds, besides marriage, for 
sustaining the trial court's award of property to her. As 
illustrated by cases in this jurisdiction as well as in others, 
an equitable division of property accumulated by unmarried 
cohabitants has been sustained upon finding a partnership,5 
contract for services,6 and/or a trust.7 However, none of 
these theories was pleaded in this case or appears to have been 
sufficiently pursued in the proceedings before the trial court. 
Helen requested partition in her amended complaint, but only in a 
generalized fashion and without the supporting information on the 
status of title required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-2 (1987).8 
There are no findings or conclusions concerning any grounds for 
the property award other than a marriage-equivalent under Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, which we have held to be inapplicable in 
view of its effective date. There are likewise no findings or 
conclusions concerning custody and child support,9 or concerning 
4. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens 
v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 1987); Carlucci v. Utah 
Industrial Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1986). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1989); Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 
1349, 1351 (Utah 1975). Partnership doctrines have sometimes 
been applied to relationships between unmarried cohabitants. 
E.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984). 
6. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Marvin v. Marvin, 
18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106 (1976). 
7. See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); In re Hock, 
655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); cf.. Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d at 
1181-82. 
8. Utah Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 39 requires investigation 
of property title and certain procedural safeguards before 
partition may be granted. It does not appear from the record 
that these requirements have yet been satisfied. 
9. See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988) 
(remanded for lack of findings on support of adult handicapped 
child). 
the effect on Helen*s property rights of the unsigned, undated 
notation. Since we do not consider the evidence in the first 
instance,10 we reverse and remand for such further findings 
and orders based thereon as the trial court deems 
appropriate. ^ 
J^f jXjJLnS/ 
obert Bullock, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
iussell W. Bench, Judge 
10. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). 
870378-CA 4 
Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
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DONALD LAYTON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. D83-3977 
i Judge David Young 
This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 
9, 1989. The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the 
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding 
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were 
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant 
responded. After considering the arguments of both parties, the 
court ordered that the theory of constructive trust be applied to 
this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause 
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties herein began living together in 1954, and lived 
together almost continuously until 1983, when this action was 
filed. 
2. The parties filed joint income taxes from 1954 until 1983. 
3. The parties pooled all of their income, which was 
exclusively from joint business endeavors, which were buying and 
selling real property, felling trees, demolition of buildings, sale 
of raspberries each summer. 
4. The parties owned no real property at the time their 
relationship began, and all real and personal property owned by 
them at the time of trial was purchased during the time they lived 
together and was purchased with joint funds. The relationship of 
the parties could be described as similar to a marriage, with the 
relationship being confidential, and with each party dependent upon 
the other for various services and emotional support during the 
time the relationship existed. 
5. The equitable distribution as rendered by the Court is 
supported by the principles of the parties1 conduct, which created 
a constructive trust. 
6. A constructive trust is arises to prevent manifest 
injustice and can be applied to almost any circumstances, as set 
forth in CJS, Sec.142 as follows: 
Generally, any transaction may be the basis for creating a 
constructive trust where for any reason the defendant holds funds 
which in equity and good consience should be possessed by the 
plaintiff, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are 
practically without limit. 
7. In this matter, the parties lived as though they were 
married, and had considerable joint assets. A great injustice 
would occur if the defendant were allowed to retain all of the 
parties1 assets, which represented the fruit of both parties' 
lifetime of work and effort. 
8. Accordingly, a constructive trust may be imposed in this 
matter, not necessarily because of the intention of the parties, 
but because the person holding title to the property would be 
unuustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. (See 
Doing vs. Riley, CA Fla., 176 F. 2d 449; Potter vs. Lindsay, 60 
N. W. 2d 133, 337 Mich. 404; Miller vs. Buecker, Comm. PI., 63 York 
Leg. Rec. 53; Copenhaver vs. Duncan, Comm. PI., 60 York Leg. Rec. 
105; McConnel vs. Dixon, 233 P. 2d 877, 68 Wyo. 301.) 
9. Utah has recognized the concept of constructive trusts, 
and has no statues barring the application of this theory in this 
matter. 
10. Their relationship and the divisions of the assets 
accumulated therein are governed by said trust whether in 
individual names or joint names. 
11. The Court further finds that matters related to property 
distribution are unchanged hereby. The Court followed equitable 
principles in dividing the property and orders that those findings 
and that distribution be set forth herein. 
12. From 1983 until June of 1987 the Defendant had complete 
control of the parties1 assets and he received all income thereon, 
and accordingly he should be responsible for all indebtedness, 
property taxes, and assessments which were levied on the property 
during that time that have not been paid by him. 
13. The parties raised four children, one of whom is 
handicapped and is in need of support beyond age 18. Danny, said 
child, is presently residing with the Plaintiff, and she is in need 
of support for his care and support in the sum of $200.00 per month 
until such time as he no longer resides with her. 
14. The Plaintiff did make the writing which states that "I 
hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name of Don 
Layton and Helen Layton." 
15. The writing was made sometime in the 1970's, and an exact 
date is impossible to determine, as the writing is not dated and 
the parties1 testimony differs as to the approximate date. 
16. There is no evidence of consideration for the writing, 
and the property mentioned therein is not identified with enough 
particularity for the court to determine what property, if any, was 
being transferred. 
17. The parties did not later ratify the writing by 
transferring all of the jointly held real or personal property into 
the name of the Defendant in reliance thereon, or otherwise 
behaving as though the writing had validity. Instead, they 
continued their relationship as they had in the past. 
18. The Court finds the note signed by the Plaintiff stating, 
"I hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don 
Layton and Helen Layton11 to be unsupported by consideration and 
further to have been ignored by the parties until the Defendant 
attempted to use it to his aadvantage in these proceedings. Thus, 
this Court finds the note to be a nullity and ignores its content. 
19. At the time of the filing of this action the parties1 
property, both real and personal, was essentially intact, and had, 
except for small sales, not been transferred to others or 
encumbered by either of them. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties confidential relationship is best 
characterized as a constructive trust. 
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or 
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal 
division according to value, as set forth below. 
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of 
the constructive trust, and have been duly notified of this action, 
and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate a need 
to equitably divide the assets of the trust. 
4. The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer 
any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported 
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties. 
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties 
shall be equitably divided between them as follows: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at 
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of 




600 ounces of silver 
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00) 
Mechanics tools 
Carpenters tools 









Substantial miscellaneous personal property 
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her 
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property 
in his possession, with the party retaining an item to be 
responsible for all indebtedness thereon. However, there is a 
substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874, 
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate 
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and 
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her. 
REAL PROPERTY: 
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is 
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto. 
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS: 
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes, 
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses 
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred 
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and 
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against 
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A. The amount of said lien 
remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the 
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the 
amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property 
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so 
desires. 
CHILD SUPPORT: 
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff 
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the 
Plaintiff. 
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance 
for Daniel so long as it is available through his or her 
employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental, 
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not 
covered by insurance. 
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel, 
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation. 
SIGN ALL PAPERS: 
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two 
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail 
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court 
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for 
her attorney's fees required in doing so. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this 
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the 
Plaintiff be successful. 
RESTRAINING ORDER: 
16. The Defendant shall be permanently restrained from 
harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
David Young 
District Court Judge 
Approved by: 
Donald W. Layton 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decree of Divorce to Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 postage prepaid this f day of jOzczc^z— # 1989. 
l*,^t O P G ^ ^ 
I / 
Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
HELEN LAYTON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DONALD LAYTON, ] 
Defendant. 
| ORDER OF DISSOLUTION OF 
| CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
| Civil No. D83-3977 
i Judge David Young 
This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 
9, 1989. The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the 
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding 
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were 
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant 
responded. After considering the arguments of both parties the 
Court has determined that the theory of constructive trust applies 
to this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause 
appearing therefor, and having made and entered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and 
decreed: 
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
1. The confidentail relationship of the parties is hereby 
characterized as a constructive trust, and said constructive trust 
created by the parties is hereby dissolved. 
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or 
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal 
division according to value, as set forth herein. 
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of 
the "constructive trust," and have been duly notified of this 
action, and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate 
a need to equitably divide the assets of the trust. 
4. The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer 
any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported 
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties. 
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties 
shall be equitably divided between them as follows: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at 
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of 




600 ounces of silver 
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00) 
Mechanics tools 
Carpenters tools 









Substantial miscellaneous personal property 
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her 
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property 
in his possession, with the party retaining an item to be 
responsible for all indebtedness thereon. However, there is a 
substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874, 
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate 
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and 
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her. 
REAL PROPERTY: 
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is 
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto. 
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS: 
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes, 
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses 
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred 
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and 
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against 
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A. The amount of said lien 
remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the 
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the 
amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property 
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so 
desires. 
CHILD SUPPORT: 
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff 
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the 
Plaintiff. 
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance 
for Daniel so long as it is available through his or her 
employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental, 
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not 
covered by insurance. 
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel, 
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation. 
SIGN ALL PAPERS: 
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two 
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail 
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court 
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for 
her attorney's fees required in doing so. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this 
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the 
Plaintiff be successful. 
***** 
RESTRAINING ORDER: 
16. The Defendant shall be permanently restrained from 
harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
David Young 
District Court Judge 
Approved by: 
Donald W. Layton 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, 
and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 postage prepaid 
this _[ day of December, 1989. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Helen Layton, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Don Layton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 900019-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Onrte (On Rule 31 Hearing) . 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
31. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the trial court's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order are affirmed. In addition, 
appellee is awarded reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal 
on the basis that the court deems appellant's appeal frivolous 
under Utah R. App. P. 33. The court finds the appeal frivolous 
on the basis that appellant raised many of the same issues in 
this appeal as he raised in his prior appeal before this court, 
his brief did not include any citations to legal aurhority see 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a), and appellant's oral argument was 
largely irrelevant. In particular, while appellant sought to 
upset the trial court's findings of fact, he wholly failed to 
"marshal the evidence," a prerequsite to our consideration of 
the adequacy of the findings of fact. See e.g., In re Bartell, 
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). We therefore remand to the trial 
court for a calculation and award of reasonable attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 1990, 
ALL CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson/^uudge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2 3rd day of November, 1990, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Don Layton 
220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Jane Allen 
Attorney at Law 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Honorable David Young 
Salt Lake County 
Third District Court 
#D83-3977 








Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Don Layton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 900019-CA 
Per ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE. 
This 19th day of December, 1990, 
Issued Nov. 23, 1990 
Record: 2 VOLS and 1 ENV 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of December, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in the 
United States mail to the following: 
Don Layton 
220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Jane Allen 
Attorney at Law 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 19th day of December, 1990. 
By *—"?/?.r/.s's; ,!^'/f 
s Deputy Clerk 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Helen Layton, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
DEC 12 
•% / . „ 
» 1 V * " 













Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No, 900019-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Bench (on Rule 31 Hearing) 
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 36(a), this matter is 
immediately remitted to the district court. 
DATED this // day of December, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ ^ . 
irman H. Jackson, Judge NO! 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of December, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was 
deposited in the United States mail to the following: 
Don Layton 
220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Jane Allen 
Attorney at Law 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 19th day of December, 1990. 
, -7. • v • 
By — - ///^ /// r^// 
Deputy Clerk 
/ 
.Y-?7 j < ~ » 
DEC 12 .:30 
\ 7 .. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS *. •,* :•; - r.Jurt 
00O00 
Helen Layton, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Don Layton, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No. 900019-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Bench (on Rule 31 Heari 
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 36(a), this matter is 
immediately remitted to the district court. 
DATED this // day of December, 1990. 
ng) 
FOR THE COURT: 
